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Tennessee v. Lane 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tennessee v. Lane (2004) 
upheld the constitutionality oflawsuits by disabled citizens 
under Title II of the 1990 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
(ADA) to enforce the fundamental right of ACCESS to courts. 
George Lane and Beverly jones, paraplegic WHEELCHAIR 
users, together brought suit against the state of Tennessee 
and a number of its counties, alleging past and ongoing vio-
lations of their respective Title II rights to physically access 
that state's court system. An attorney, Lane was compelled 
to crawl up flights of stairs to answer criminal charges in a 
courtroom located on the second floor of a courthouse with-
out an elevator. When he refused to either crawl or be carried 
up those stairs for a subsequent hearing, Lane was arrested 
and jailed for his failure to appear. jones, a certified court 
reporter, asserted that she could not phYSically access sev-
eral county courthouses, in consequence of which she had 
lost work opportunities and also been excluded from par-
ticipating in the judiCial process. They collectively requested 
monetary damages and injunctive relief. Tennessee sought to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the Eleventh 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution barred the action due 
to sovereign immunity (a legal concept meaning that a gov-
ernment cannot be sued unless it grants permission to be 
sued). The federal district court denied Tennessee's motion, 
a court of appeals panel affirmed that decision, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari (a writ from a higher court 
to a lower one) to hear the case. 
The Court was strongly divided, with a bare 5-4 majority 
issuing an equally narrow opinion in favor of Lane and jones. 
Writing for the majority, justice john Paul Stevens held that 
Congress had validly exercised its enforcement power under 
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated 
Tennessee's sovereign immunity and permitted private mon-
etary actions under ADA Title II to enforce access to court 
services. The Court reached this conclusion after finding that 
"congruence and proportionality" existed between the harm 
that was avoided or remedied and the means employed to 
achieve that end. Justice Stevens noted evidence presented 
before Congress while deliberating the ADA that some three-
quarters of public services and programs, including access 
to courts located in state-owned buildings were inaccessible 
to people with disabilities. He cautioned, however, that Title 
II only required states to make reasonable modifications on 
behalf of qualified individuals with disabilities to existing 
programs and services. Such alterations, which could not 
fundamentally alter the nature of services, did not require 
states "to employ any and all means to make judicial services 
accessible to persons with disabilities:' 
In addition to the majority ruling, the Court issued two 
separate concurring opinions and three separate dissent-
ing opinions. Most notable was the dissent written by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist equating the case to GARRETT V. 
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (2001). That decision, for which 
he wrote the 5-4 majority opinion. ruled that states were 
possessed of sovereign immunity from monetary claims for 
ADA employment-related violations because the plaintiffs 
had not demonstrated a pattern of employment-related con-
stitutional violations by states. In Tennessee v. Lane, the chief 
justice was similarly unpersuaded that individuals with dis-
abilities were systemically excluded by states from accessing 
court services and therefore argued that their ADA claims 
were likewise barred. 
Although ostensibly a victory for people with disabilities 
(as well as for those who disagreed with the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism line of cases), the majority decision in Tennessee 
v. Lane was the by-product of a fractured Court and limited 
in scope. Despite the ADXs prohibition against excluding 
people with disabilities from the benefits of services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, the Court confined 
its holding to the rights of two individuals to access courts. 
Moreover, Justice Stevens did not elaborate on what might 
involve access to courts. For instance, it is unclear whether 
the ruling extends to sign language interpretation, BRAILLE 
transcription, or sound-amplifying infrared hearing loops 
for parties, witnesses, or jurors. The majority ruling likewise 
left open the question of whether people with disabilities can 
gain monetary relief under Title II when denied access to 
other state facilities, programs, and services. Consequently, 
although Tennessee v. Lane was a victory for disability rights 
advocates, its Significance as a precedent for ADA Title II 
claims is unclear. 
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